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FOREWORD
MAURICE WALLACE
When feminist critic and theorist Toril Moi undertook a grappling with the
1
deceptively simple sentence “What is a woman?” in her eponymous 1999 work,
the question carried the pitch of a riddle. With Simone de Beauvoir’s The Second
2
Sex for its touchstone, Moi’s title essay posited “a theory of the sexually differ3
ent body” that invoked de Beauvoir specifically in order to identify where, by a
too-narrow apprehension of a wide-reaching de Beauvoir, contemporary feminist thought lost its way. Taking too much for granted what it has presumed to
know for at least a generation about the difference between sex and gender, contemporary feminist theory, according to Moi, today mistakes its “reformist”
conclusions for “revolutionary” ones inasmuch it continues to retain “as starting
4
points for [its] theories of subjectivity, identity, and bodily sexual difference”
the self-same sex/gender distinction it’s been intently dedicated to deconstructing. That is, while poststructuralist feminists have been careful to insist upon
the social constructedness of gender, and have decried the impulse of the previous generation to essentialize sex by reflexively (and misleadingly) opposing
gender to sex (sex being merely “the . . . surface on which the script of gender is
5
written” ), these theorists nevertheless require fundamentally what they reject.
Perhaps then, Moi suggests, much less is known about “what it means to be a
6
woman (or a man) in a given society” than we imagine, the impressive evolution of feminist thought since the 1960s notwithstanding. In Moi, academic
feminism is urged therefore to return to its first works: “Lacan returned to
7
Freud; it is time for feminists to return to Beauvoir” for “exactly the kind of
non-essentialist, concrete, historical and social understanding of the body that so
many contemporary feminists,” bedeviled by their structuralist disavowals, “are
8
looking for.” But returning again to feminism’s first works may not be entirely
possible, it turns out. Reading Ian Halley’s provocative essay Queer Theory By
9
Men, one has the sense that in the pursuit of an improved epistemology of sex,
gender and the body, feminism is its own worst antagonist.
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In the fall of 2002, Harvard University Law Professor Janet Halley delivered the annual Brainerd Currie Memorial Lecture at the Duke University
School of Law. That lecture, A Map of Feminist and Queer Theories of Sexuality and
10
Sexual Regulation, formed the basis of what was to become, under the signature
of Ian Halley, Queer Theory by Men, the feature essay in this issue of the Duke
Journal of Gender Law and Policy. If there is a singular idea distinguishing Halley’s Queer Theory By Men from other avowedly left reflections on today’s legal
gender troubles, it is surely his appeal to an epistemologically inflected politics
of divergence between feminism and other pro-sex projects like pornography
studies, sex liberationism, and queer theory. Halley proposes, in short, that
11
gender and queer theorists “Take a Break from Feminism.” For on the legal
question of what a woman is, to reframe Moi, or, on the problem of power in
erotic contexts, any determinedly feminist effort to explain such quandries is
bound to short-circuit and frustrate its own feminist aims. The trouble with
feminism, he avers, is its resignation—its reductiveness, one might say—to a
categorical binarity it cannot, in spite of itself, seem to get around or through,
despite its accepted hybridities of history, race, class, and method. Although
“different feminisms”, he points out, distinguish women and men “differently”
(“[S]ome see men and women, some see male and female, some see masculine
12
and feminine” ), under them all, Halley argues, “men” and “women” are “almost always” conceived as two discrete, if still yet distinct, human groups none13
theless. Further, nothing that can be called feminist can avoid turning “in some
central or core way on [that finally reductive] distinction between M[ale] and
14
F[emale].” The binary reflex stuck intractably in the craw of academic feminism (set in sharp relief by Moi), then, recommends another course, we are told,
for more productively theorizing those problematics of sexuality and power that
feminism has presumptuously, Halley implies, taken for its own proper study.
In Queer Theory by Men, Halley proposes an analytical departure away from
properly feminist musings on sex, gender and power toward a more productively queer theoretical landscape, one more easily impervious to the abjecting
subordination hypothesis (advanced famously by Catharine MacKinnon) that
has, on Halley’s view, quietly underwritten feminism for so long. To the degree
that there is a “sexuality side” to what a woman is, in other words, what she is
is not therefore, feminism’s project exclusively. The question of what a woman
is, he means to say, is (or ought to be) also available to “other
left/liberal/progressive projects that [not only] take sexuality and power as
their domain of operation . . . [but also] lack a primary focus on M/F [oppositionality] and often do not primarily concern themselves with [the political pre15
sumption that] M>F.” Among these parallel projects, Halley marks out queer
theory as the privileged site of an urgent deconstruction of sex that regards bodies, sex acts, erotic desires, sexual identity and love as wholly disjunctive ideas,
10. Janet Halley, A Map of Feminist and Queer Theories of Sexuality and Sexual Regulation,
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too incongruous in fact to uphold a male/female opposition in theory. It is precisely because queer theory doesn’t require feminism’s devotion to the identity
category “woman” (or its historical associations) for a progressive liberationist
theory of sexuality that Halley forcefully urges us toward the expediency of
queer theory written by men. Leo Bersani’s rebellious essay Is the Rectum a
16
Grave? and Duncan Kennedy’s irreverent Sexual Abuse, Sexy Dressing and the
17
Eroticization of Domination are Halley’s touchstones of choice in this dilative call
for a theory of sex without feminism, “one adequate to the neorealist and postmodernizing views of the complexity with which legal rules and social actors
18
interact.” As every call merits a response, it is no surprise that Queer Theory by
Men found ready commentators in three Duke professors who share with Halley
some background in critical theory, queer theory, or poststructural feminism.
19
Where Halley invoked the legal complexities of Twyman v. Twyman, a 1993
Texas divorce case involving sadomasochistic sex, connubial duty, a premarital
rape disclosure and emotional abuse in order to expose the axiological limits of
feminist legal theory in deciding such cases, Jane M. Gaines’s response piece,
Sexual Semiosis would seem to at once flatter and euchre Halley’s by offering up
“new unanticipated agents involved in the production of desire” that “an earlier
20
feminism might not have imagined” : namely, pills that offer a short-lived remedy for erectile dysfunction. Like the legal complicatedness of consent, pain,
pleasure, and intentionality in Twyman, the unimaginable involvedness of the
law surrounding domestic abuse and rape amidst the ever-widening commercial availability of Viagra pills and their knock-offs begs “for serious feminist
21
consideration,” an iteration of first departure from Halley. In Sexual Semiosis
Gaines is less interested in Taking a Break from Feminism as she is in Giving
Feminism a Break, not by a reflexive defense of feminism’s forever-and-always
22
utility, but by opposing feminist theory “as establishment,” breaking with
some of its curiously doctrinal presumptions about women’s power(lessness)
within, for example, the disciplining of sex by marriage law. “Can we give
feminism a break long enough to study the emergence of what we might call
23
‘popular feminism?’” Gaines asks, instructively. It is perhaps at the level of the
24
popular (“where,” as Halley says, “power meets the population,” ) that Gaines
makes her most important intervention. For Gaines, how effectively any sex
project, in popular feminism or queer theory, illuminates the disciplinary instrumentality of sex within “the history of a ‘law of husband and wife’ in the
25
United States” is ultimately the best test of its mettle. Alive to a place Halley
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doesn’t go, Sexual Semiosis takes Queer Theory by Men there, as Gaines posits the
26
problem of “marital monogamy” as a legalized monopoly on a women’s body,
in a still deeper interrogation of the kind of decisional conundrum represented
27
by Twyman v. Twyman.
If Gaines’ Sexual Semiosis seems most concerned with the possibilities of
advancing sexuality studies precisely where Queer Theory by Men resists treading, Ranjana Khanna’s comment to Halley, Signatures of the Impossible, is dedi28
cated to the redress of a much-maligned cultural feminism. From the first,
Khanna casts suspicion on Halley’s version of the conceptual and political limits
of cultural feminism, not only questioning whether “feminism, any more or less
than queer theory, really [has] to be primarily about gender and the logic of
29
m/f,” but underlining as well the manifest illogic of the persistent conditions of
gender subordination rendered, in effect, unassailable now by the so-called gender-free discourse left in the wake of an abdication of feminism. Khanna is no
fan of Taking a Break from Feminism, not least because the very idea of its discursive possibility is “misguided” and a “ploy that is complicit with a neo30
liberal heterosexist paradigm” that queer theory, in spite of Halley, has set
about to dismantle. In making her case unequivocally against Halley’s antifeminism, however, Khanna follows a decidedly psychoanalytic tack, arguing
rigorously with Halley’s neglect of Bersani’s Freudian background, especially, in
making his (Halley’s) case for the utilitarian appeal of certain queer speculations
on sex by male theorists. As a result, Halley mistakes the seeming radicality of
Bersani’s queer commitment to self-dissolution through a sexual jouissance “as
something peculiar to homosexuality rather than to [the psychoanalytic cate31
gory] of melancholia more generally.” He is therefore blind to the critical way
in which both the melancholic and the gay man’s self-shattering cannot avoid
the stubborn trace of the past self pressed into their respective psychic archives.
Perhaps more arrestingly, inside of this melancholic framework, Halley’s disavowal of feminism carries the inescapable reminder of its remainder, despite
his indifference to it. Thus, “Ian has not put feminism into question,” Khanna
concludes; instead, “he has acted out through disavowal” the impossibility of
32
feminism’s full undoing.
As Khanna’s title hints at, and her article confronts intrepidly, much is to be
made of the signatory difference obtaining between a past “Janet Halley,” the
2002 Brainerd Currie lecturer and author of the first draft of Queer Theory by
Men, and a more recent “Ian Halley,” signatory of the article published here.
While Khanna submits the difference to a productively Derridean psychoanalysis (“Ian seems to want to write as if a signature really can do the work of sustaining self-identity, coherence, prior and future existence . . . all of which is put
33
into doubt by the very necessity of it.” ), Robyn Wiegman’s Dear Ian is more
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
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steadfastly interested in demonstrating what the signatory difference means in
light of the consequence that Taking a Break from Feminism in this case resigns
to a man, Ian, a critical space of knowledge production about women formerly
maintained by a lesbian, Janet. In an epistolary response, Wiegman addresses
Halley directly, questioning “hir” strawman construction of both “a highly dis34
ciplined and disciplining” normative feminism whose urgent refusal thus creates the space of Ian’s usurpation and the counterfiction of a wider, epistemically freer queer epistemology, ethically unimpeachable. Alternately impatient
and sympathetic, Wiegman sets out to correct certain of Halley’s assumptions
about the convergentist capacity of feminism and queer theory that both underwrite Halley’s belief in the feminist failure in sexuality studies and inspire its
abandonment in a politics of vigilant divergentism. Feminism and queer theory,
Weigman emphasizes, are not altogether analogous projects as Halley supposes.
Between them are “discordant temporalities” that, in fact, militate against con35
vergentist ambitions. These discordant temporalities are crucial to Wiegman’s
critique of Queer Theory by Men and Halley’s fundamental reinforcement of the
heterosexist framework that, in the interest of foregrounding the erotic economies of men’s sexual interests, straight and gay, erases, Weigman points out, the
lesbian figure altogether.
Wiegman posits five discriminations at the base of the temporalities dividing feminism and queer theory. She argues, first, that queer theory’s capacity to
deconstruct certain of feminism’s historical presumptions is evidence of neither
36
“the enduring truth of the queer theoretic” nor “the faulty logic of feminism,”
but rather of queer theory’s instrumentality in making legible the nuance between what is finally a knowledge project (for example, feminist epistemology,
queer theory) and what is, on the other hand, an academically informed reform
agenda (for example, gay and lesbian studies, popular feminism). Second, critique alone is insufficient to produce the divergence Halley believes Queer Theory by Men to perform. It is only a part of the bigger process by which divergence brings to light the difference between what Weigman’s calls “the social
37
movement formulation of identity studies” and the knowledge project(s) beneath identity production and politics. Third, while it is important to recognize
the distinction between dedicated knowledge projects and reform efforts (per
Weigman’s first articulation of discordant temporalities), social movements are
themselves knowledge projects too that help to foreground the politics of
knowledge production—what we know, who knows it, and how to organize
what we think we know—in and around the academy. Fourth, the study of
identity and its politics cannot be properly understood apart from a consideration of the social field that confers its inaugural currency, nor can such study be
limited to social fields alone. Finally, Wiegman proposes that, contrary to the
popular belief that institutionalization undermines movements, the institutionalization of identity studies as, say, Women’s Studies or Gender Studies, may
well be an important part of the divergentist wish to bring into view and formal-

34.
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ize new complementing genealogies of identitarian knowledge and their limits.
All of these discriminations, Wiegman puts forward in the service of an argument for a politics of divergence that nevertheless issues from very different motives than Halley’s. Dear Ian urges Halley toward an expanded consideration of
the politics of divergentism. In a way, feminism lives, however embattled, and
is preserved, however precariously, by just such a politics. Under a divergentist
commitment, Taking a Break from Feminism may be infinitely easier said than
done.
Insofar as the three response pieces by Jaine Gaines, Ranjana Khanna, and
Robyn Wiegman, all, in greater or lesser volume, seem earnest in their effort to
persuade Ian Halley of the unimaginable difficulty of Taking a Break from
Feminism, it would seem that, despite its convergentist aversion, and for all its
talk and text about divergentism, Queer Theory by Men has provoked a productive convergence of theoretical voices after all. On the state of feminism, on sex
and the social, on the law and the politics of positionality (in marriage, in sex
acts, in institutions), to say nothing of the curiosity of queer theory by men,
these are divergently suggestive essays—all four them—each one in its own
right. But the conversation they enact here in the Duke Journal of Gender Law and
Policy is very nearly a convergentist’s fantasy.

